Revisiting Somaliland’s Case for Independence
By. Ibrahim Sultan
First
Published on January 11, 2024
The topic of Somaliland’s secession
from Somalia resurfaces periodically, and it has recently come into the
spotlight again as Ethiopia and Somaliland have entered into a memorandum of understanding. This raises the pertinent question:
Do the arguments for Somaliland’s secession rest on a solid philosophical
foundation?
Somaliland builds its case for
secession on two pivotal points. First, it reasserted its sovereignty in 1991
following the collapse of the united government formed in 1960 between the
British Somaliland protectorate (the North) and Italian Somaliland (the South).
This union was plagued by an egregious failure to maintain equitable principles
of power and resource sharing, precipitating acts of violence and massacres
against the people of Somaliland. Second, Somaliland argues that it would
consider reunification if Somalia’s southern regions could establish political
and security conditions conducive to unity, a milestone that remains
unachieved.
In the three decades since it
re-established sovereignty, Somaliland has witnessed the emergence of new
visions. Its younger population has come of age under a separate flag, and the
notion of secession has garnered global attention, drawing analogies with other
movements like those in Kurdistan, Scotland, and Catalonia, and following
precedents set by successful secessions such as those of East Timor and South
Sudan.
Globalization has arguably diminished the allure
of large nation-states, especially from an economic standpoint, leading to a
greater reliance on regional and international alliances. However, it remains
to be debated whether Somaliland’s arguments possess the requisite
philosophical substance.
When considering the constitutional
theories of secession, it is imperative to scrutinize whether Somalia’s Provisional Constitution
accommodates a right
to secede. As it stands, the constitution does not grant this right,
reinforcing the view of Somalia as a federal republic.
Yet, some scholars within this
discourse argue that secession may be justifiable as a recourse for grievous
injustices perpetrated by the state against a separatist group. Political and
legal philosopher Allen Buchanan, for instance, delineates three particular
injustices that could warrant secession: large-scale human rights violations,
the unjust annexation of territories, and sustained breaches of intrastate
autonomy agreements.
On examining the first justification,
it is evident that Somaliland has been subjected to acts of genocide and
widespread human rights abuses. The genesis of these atrocities can be traced
back to the detention of prominent figures during the 1969 military coup,
culminating in the extensive bombardment of urban centers. While some lay the
blame on armed factions for initiating guerrilla warfare, the fundamental issue
originated from political interference and oppression by the military junta.
Ascriptivist perspectives assert that
the right to self-determination is confined to groups defined by unique
characteristics such as nationality, religion, or ethnicity. By this logic,
Somaliland’s claim to secession might seem untenable given its shared cultural
markers with the rest of Somalia. However, Somaliland could counter this view
by pointing to Djibouti, where a Somali ethnic majority has formed an
independent state. Additionally, it is pertinent to contemplate whether the
entrenched tribalism in Somalia poses a more significant threat than any ethnic
divergence, as internal homogeneity can sometimes engender more strife than a
pluralistic society.
Proponents of the plebiscitary theory
anchor the right to secede on the principle of self-determination, contending
that this principle is of such paramount importance that it can legitimize
absolute political sovereignty under specific circumstances. Somaliland
frequently invokes this theory, given that a majority endorsed secession by
ratifying Somaliland’s Constitution in 2001.
Nevertheless, plebiscitary theories
also stress the importance of ensuring that the secession does not impair the
residual state’s functionality. In Somaliland’s case, its departure, which
would include territories rich in oil, is unlikely to jeopardize Somalia’s
resource base, as both the northeastern and central regions of Somalia boast
abundant oil and gas reserves, and the southern parts have rich agricultural
and water resources.
Still, the potential cascade effect
of secession, which might lead to the disintegration of the nation into smaller
regions, could spell disaster for political and economic equilibrium, both
within the country and beyond its borders. This concern is not unfounded, as
evidenced by the secession of Khatumo State from Somaliland and its subsequent
allegiance to the Federal Republic of Somalia after a violent conflict.
Contemplating secession through the
prism of just war theory, the legitimacy of force in the separatist movements
of the 1980s and early 1990s becomes a central concern. Certain interpretations
of this theory posit that the use of force is justifiable solely when it serves
to rectify severe injustices or to safeguard vital rights of
self-determination.
In the context of Somaliland, the
armed resistance to reclaim sovereignty may be viewed as a reaction to the
severe human rights violations and institutional injustices it endured under
the Somali regime. Nevertheless, it is critical to acknowledge that force
should be contemplated only as a final option, and all peaceful alternatives
must be thoroughly pursued before resorting to armed conflict.
The philosophical robustness of
Somaliland’s bid for secession is a mosaic of historical grievances, human
rights infringements, and the democratic will expressed through popular vote.
While Somaliland’s arguments find resonance with certain secessionist theories,
like those advocating for remedial rights and plebiscitary support, there are
also counterarguments that challenge the impact of secession on regional
stability and the potential for further fragmentation. The philosophical merit
of Somaliland’s secessionist claims is a subjective matter, largely dependent
on which theories and principles are deemed paramount.
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